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Abstract
Rejection can convey that one is seen as inferior and not worth bothering with. Is it possible for people to feel vicariously
rejected in this sense and have reactions that are similar to those following personal rejection, such as feeling humiliated,
powerless, and angry? A study on personal rejection was followed by two main studies on vicarious group-based rejection.
It was found that merely observing rejection of ingroup members can trigger feelings of humiliation that are equally intense
as those experienced in response to personal rejection. Moreover, given that the rejection is explicit, vicariously experienced
feelings of humiliation can be accompanied by powerlessness and anger. Potentially, this combination of emotions could be
an important source of offensive action against rejecters.
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Introduction
Humiliation is often believed to be a driving force behind social
conflicts. Scholars have stressed the role that humiliation plays in,
for instance, international politics [1], intractable conflicts [2],
genocide [3] psychosocial maladies [4], and high school shootings
[5]. The experience of humiliation is typically described as a
strong emotional reaction to being ostracized, i.e. to being rejected
in the sense of being made to feel small or worthless [6,7]. In the
remainder of this paper, we use ostracism and rejection in this
sense synonymously. Humiliation signals to victims that they are
rejected in the sense that they are seen as inferior and ‘‘not worth
bothering with’’ [8]. For instance, Baumeister, Wotman and
Stillwell [9] argued that rejection by a potential romantic partner
conveys a symbolic message that one is perceived to lack sufficient
desirable qualities to be a worthy partner, and hence induces
humiliation. Experiences of social rejection in this sense can create
serious deficits in the satisfaction of social needs, with the potential
of pathological consequences [10]. Research on emotional and
attitudinal responses toward social rejection mostly focuses on
situations in which one is personally rejected.
In the present paper, our interest is in rejection and humiliation
in intergroup settings, specifically in contexts in which the
individual is not personally involved but that concern other
ingroup members. The driving question is whether it is possible to
feel humiliated by just observing members of one’s ingroup being
rejected. If people can experience humiliation in response to
rejection of others with whom they identify, humiliating experi-
ences could potentially spread easily through a social system. In
this article, we examine this possibility of vicarious group-based
rejection, and the possibility that vicarious rejection triggers
emotional responses that are similar to being rejected oneself.
Research on humiliation is scarce and to our knowledge, no
studies have examined whether people can feel humiliated by just
witnessing ingroup members being rejected.
Humiliation, powerlessness and anger
Central to the experience of humiliation is that one is deprived
of power and controlled by a third party [2]. Or, as Lindner [11]
puts it, ‘‘the victim is forced into passivity, acted upon, made
helpless’’. Some have suggested that this loss of power may lead to
inertia; a tendency toward inaction that suppresses aggressive
responses [12] and hence should be accompanied with action-
inhibiting emotions like fear and shame. However, in line with
appraisal theories of emotion (e.g., [13]) and previous findings on
social rejection [14] and humiliation [15,16] we believe that
precisely because the humiliation is inflicted by a perpetrator it is
more likely to be associated with action-oriented emotions,
predominantly anger [13].
Research findings by Kamans, Otten and Gordijn [17] suggest
that when people face an obstacle threat (e.g., to obtaining valued
goods), powerlessness is likely to be associated with anger aimed at
removing the obstacles, but not with fear. Conversely, although
humiliation is often used interchangeably with shame [18], some
suggest that the two emotions are likely to be distinct [16].
Whereas humiliation stems from the behavior of others and
triggers a focus on the perpetrator, shame is believed to stem from
one’s own acts and is, therefore, likely to trigger a focus on the self
[6,19]. As such, whereas humiliation is perceived as unfair and
undeserved [20], shame signals that one’s own behavior can cause
exclusion and hence is likely to inhibit behaviors that may
potentially cause further damage to social relationships (e.g.,
aggression). This leads us to propose that feelings of humiliation
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are likely to be associated with feelings of powerlessness and anger,
and that this also holds for vicarious humiliation.
Vicarious group-based humiliation: Witnessing rejection
of ingroup members
There is some evidence for the similarity of personal and group-
membership based experiences. For example, research has shown
that being ostracized by a member of an outgroup on the basis of
one’s group membership triggers levels of distress equal to those
triggered by being ostracized as an individual [21], regardless of
whether the perpetrator represents one’s ingroup, a rival outgroup,
or a despised outgroup [22]. We know of only one study in which
group-based humiliation was empirically examined. Leidner and
colleagues [23] had participants self-identify with a minority group
and subsequently recall a situation in which they were humiliated
because of their group membership. The authors found that
feelings of humiliation are associated with powerlessness and, in
some respects, with anger. The proposition we would like to make
and test goes one step further. Whereas Leidner et al. [23]
examined (memories of) personally experienced group member-
ship-based humiliation, the proposition that is central to our study
is that humiliation can also be experienced vicariously, i.e., after just
observing the rejection of members of the ingroup rather than
being personally rejected as an individual or as a member of a
group.
A first hint that people may vicariously experience other
people’s pain stems from empathy research. Focusing mostly on
physical pain, research has shown that vicariously experienced
pain activates the same brain regions as directly experienced pain
and triggers associated responses [24]. In recent years, research on
vicarious social pain has gradually emerged. Wesselman and
colleagues [25] identified nine experimental studies, the majority
of which used Williams’ [26–27] Cyberball paradigm to examine
reactions to ostracism in an online ball-tossing game. It was found
in these studies that observing ostracism activates relevant brain
regions and corresponding feelings in observers (e.g., [28–29]). As
such, witnessing others being ostracized can make the observer feel
ostracized himself. Similar results have been found for vicarious
embarrassment [30]. However, empathetic responses to vicarious
rejection seem to depend on emotional closeness with the victim
[31–32]. For example, Wesselman, Bagg and Williams [33] found
that observers who consciously identified with a victim of ostracism
reported greater need threat than observers who did not.
Similarly, Beeney et al. [32] demonstrated that witnessing a friend
being included and then excluded prompts empathetic brain
activity and that emotional closeness with the victim is a powerful
positive moderator of this response.
Supported by existing research findings in social psychology, we
suggest that similar results may be expected when the person’s
relationship with the victim is defined by group membership, such
that observing social rejection may trigger feelings of humiliation
when the victim belongs to the ingroup, but not to the outgroup.
Research has shown that situations that involve (members of) one’s
ingroup but not oneself can trigger emotional reactions that are
similar to those of people who are directly involved. Combining
insights from self-categorization theory [34] and appraisal theory
[13,35] Smith [36] developed a model of social emotions based on
the idea that when group membership is salient, the ingroup
becomes part of the psychological self. In that case, issues that
concern the group by definition concern the individual [37–38].
As a consequence, people can experience emotions in response to
events that affect (members of) their group rather than themselves.
For instance, confronting people with ingroup members maltreat-
ment of outgroup members induced feelings of guilt in them, even
when they personally had not participated in the wrongdoing [39].
Similarly, confronting Surinamese with their group’s history of
slavery aroused feelings of anger and the desire for reparation by
the outgroup [40]. Harth and colleagues [41] examined emotional
and attitudinal reactions to rejection of reconciliation gestures by
victimized outgroup members. Participants whose ingroup had
first transgressed against an outgroup and subsequently offered a
reconciliatory gesture (i.e., an apology or repair), reacted with
anger (but not shame and anxiety) and offensive responses against
the outgroup when the gesture was rejected.
Similar reactions were found for events that did not concern the
group as a whole, but individual group members. For example, in
research by Gordijn and colleagues [42–44], participants observed
intentional and unfair behavior by members of an outgroup that
negatively affected others, but not themselves. Participants who
categorized the victims as belonging to the ingroup experienced
more anger than participants who categorized the victims as
belonging to the outgroup. Perceiving the victims as ingroup
members also led to offensive action tendencies, such as protesting
against the perpetrators or trying to prevent the perpetrators’
actions. In contrast, participants who perceived the victims as
outgroup members reported no anger or offensive action
tendencies. Together, these studies demonstrated that people can
experience strong emotions when they are not personally involved,
but when ingroup members are involved.
In analogy to these findings, we reason that if social rejection in
the sense that one is seen as inferior and not worth bothering with
can cause feelings of humiliation, and if people can experience
emotional responses to events that concern members of their
ingroup, then it follows that observing the rejection of ingroup
members can activate feelings of humiliation. This possibility has
not been well investigated to date. Therefore, in the present study,
we aim to test experimentally whether or not vicarious group-
based humiliation exists and, if so, whether it equals personal
humiliation in strength. Such a finding would be socially relevant,
because it would imply that social rejection of a small proportion
of a social group might suffice to trigger offensive and action-
oriented responses of other group members, aimed at redressing
the (vicarious) experience of rejection. Moreover, given that social
rejection can cause serious threats to fundamental needs, such as
belonging, control, self-esteem, and meaningful existence (e.g.,
[45]), experiences of humiliation may not only negatively affect
individual members, but also the group as a whole.
The Present Research: Overview and Hypotheses
We conducted a series of experimental studies to test the
hypothesis that people can experience humiliation, powerlessness,
and anger when they observe that ingroup members are rejected,
even when they are not personally involved in the situation. In
Study 1, we aimed to show that social rejection is indeed a source
of humiliation and, in addition, to establish a paradigm for the
vicarious group-based rejection. To that end, we used Williams’
[26,27] Cyberball paradigm as a means to induce personal
humiliation. In Study 2, we applied this same paradigm to
vicarious group-based rejection and humiliation (our main focus).
Study 2 uses a minimal group paradigm that lacks reference to the
real world. Therefore, in Study 3, we used existing political
differences as basis for ingroup/outgroup differences [22], and we
used a stronger form of rejection. In all three studies, we measured
feelings of humiliation, powerlessness, and anger after the rejection
manipulations. For all our studies, author requirements proposed
by Simmons, Nelson and Simonsohn [46] were followed. A
minimum of twenty observations per cell was collected, and all
observations were collected prior to the data analyses.
Vicarious Group-Based Rejection
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Study 1
The main goal of Study 1 was to test the experimental rejection
paradigm for inducing humiliation by examining whether people
who are rejected indeed feel humiliated, and whether humiliation
is associated with powerlessness and anger. The rejection
manipulation was based on Williams’ [26,27] Cyberball paradigm,
in which participants believe themselves to be playing a ball-toss
game with two or three other players, who are actually computer-
programmed confederates. These confederate players are pro-
grammed to initially include and then exclude the participant,
thereby creating rejection. Because the participants are repeatedly
excluded, we can speak of ostracism. Previous research has shown
that being ostracized in this game leads people to feel sad and
angry, and it lowers levels of belonging, self-esteem, control, and
meaningful existence [45]. In this first study, we tested whether it
triggered the predicted emotional combination of humiliation,
powerlessness, and anger.
Method
Ethics statement. The study and procedures were approved
by the Ethical Committee Psychology (ECP) of the Department of
Psychology of the University of Groningen. Participants responded
to flyers advertising the study, which were distributed in public
areas of different university buildings (e.g., the university library,
several faculties), and volunteered to participate in the study. Upon
arrival, participants were personally welcomed by the researchers
and informed about the nature and duration of the study and of
any possible risks or difficulties involved. Participants were
explicitly told that participation in the study was anonymous
and voluntary and that they could decide to withdraw at any
moment, or could choose to refrain from answering questions in
the survey without consequences of any type. When participants
decided to participate in the study, they received the same
information again on the introduction screen of the study. All data
were anonymized upon collection by assigning each participant
with a unique identifier, which does not link to the participant’s
identity. After the study, the participants were personally debriefed
in writing (i.e., on the screen) as well as orally by the researchers,
during which they were again informed that they could decide to
withdraw their answers. No participants objected to having their
data analyzed.
Participants and design. Thirty-five male and 24 female
undergraduate students (Mage = 21.80, SD = 2.65) from the
University of Groningen participated voluntarily in the study in
exchange for 5 euros. Participants were randomly assigned to one
of two treatments: being ostracized or included in a game of
Cyberball that lasted for 30 tosses [27]. Based on a discussion in
the literature that the experience of humiliation might be
intensified by the presence of an audience that witnesses the
rejection [6,15] we included a between-subjects factor (exposure:
public vs. private) to explore whether the sensation of being
publicly exposed enhanced humiliation after rejection. In half of
the cases we attached a webcam to the screen and told participants
in the introduction to the study that the interaction would be
observed by a group of psychology students, who were allegedly
taking a practicum in another room in the building. In reality, the
webcam was not connected and no footage was recorded. As our
focus was on the link between rejection and humiliation rather
than on the role of public exposure, and the presence of a webcam
did not influence the results (multivariate p = .56), we decided not
to include the factor in the analyses.
Procedure. Upon arrival at the testing room, participants
were seated at computers in individual cubicles. All instructions
were presented on the screen. Participants were asked to log on to
Cyberball with two other (computer-generated) participants.
Depending on the condition, participants received one third of
the tosses (inclusion condition), or only two and then none for the
remainder of the game (ostracism condition). Throughout the
game, every player was represented by an icon on the screen that
was identified by the player’s initials.
Dependent variables. After the game, participants were
asked to rate on a series of 7-point scales ranging from 1
(absolutely not) to 7 (absolutely) how they had felt during the
game. We measured to what extent the participants had felt
humiliated (i.e., degraded, humiliated, belittled; Cronbach’s a = .91),
powerless (i.e., impotent, helpless, discouraged; Cronbach’s a = .82),
and angry (i.e., angry, outraged, annoyed; Cronbach’s a = .87). We
also measured shame (i.e., ashamed, feeling shame; Cronbach’s
a = .91) and fear (i.e., anxious, afraid, scared; Cronbach’s a = .73).
We also measured the extent to which they felt happy (i.e.,
optimistic, happy, cheerful, positive; Cronbach’s a = .90). To avoid
the impression that we expected participants to have particular
emotions, the items were collected as part of a larger battery of
twenty-four emotions. In addition, in order to increase the salience
of ingroup/outgroup differences, some questions were asked about
how the participants believed they were being viewed by the other
players in the game, and about their ideas about what kind of
people the other players were. These extra items by themselves
were of no interest to us, other than their function to improve the
measurement of the focal variables. We therefore do not discuss
them further in this paper.
Results
Humiliation. We tested our predictions by performing an
ANOVA using the ostracism manipulation (inclusion vs. ostra-
cism) as the predictor of feelings of humiliation. As expected,
humiliation was significantly predicted by the ostracism manipu-
lation, F (1, 57) = 17.16, p,.01, gp
2 = .23. Being ostracized
triggered stronger feelings of humiliation (M = 3.24, SD = 1.51)
than being included (M = 1.77, SD = 1.12).
Powerlessness. The ostracism manipulation also had a
significant effect on feelings of powerlessness, F (1, 57) = 10.35,
p,.01, gp
2 = .15. Ostracized participants felt more powerless
(M = 3.14, SD = 1.22) than included participants (M = 2.08,
SD = 1.29).
Anger. Also as expected, the ostracism manipulation signifi-
cantly predicted feelings of anger, F (1, 57) = 11.85, p,.01,
gp
2 = .17. Ostracized participants experienced more anger
(M = 3.24, SD = 1.51) than included participants (M = 1.97,
SD = 1.33).
Other emotions. With respect to fear (M = 1.63, SD = 0.83)
and shame (M = 1.77, SD = 1.03), no significant effect of ostracism
was found, F’s,1. With respect to happiness, a significant effect of
the ostracism manipulation was found showing that people in the
inclusion condition felt happier (M = 4.63, SD = 1.19) than people
in the ostracism condition (M = 3.63, SD = 1.01), F (1, 57) = 11.86,
p,.01, gp
2 = .17.
Factor analysis. To examine the proposed link between
humiliation, powerlessness and anger, we performed a factor
analysis. The 18 items were submitted to a principal component
analysis (Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normalization). The factor
solution revealed 3 factors with an Eigenvalue . 1. As can be seen
in Table 1, we found the expected humiliation factor with the
humiliation, powerlessness, and anger items (Eigenvalue = 9.15;
explained variance = 51%). Further, we found a ‘happiness’ factor
that included all positive items (Eigenvalue = 1.30; explained
Vicarious Group-Based Rejection
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variance = 7%), and a factor that included the shame and fear
items (Eigenvalue = 2.42; explained variance = 13%).
Discussion
The findings of Study 1 suggest that people can feel humiliated
after being ostracized in the Cyberball paradigm. As such, Study 1
offers a useful starting point to move from examining the link
between personal rejection and humiliation to examining that
between vicarious group-based rejection and humiliation, which
was the central focus of the present research. Study 1 replicated
earlier findings on social rejection (for a review, see [48,49]) and
on the characteristic link of humiliation with both powerlessness
and anger [23]. That humiliation does not necessarily lead to
inertia (as suggested by [12]) can be gleaned from the fact that
factor analysis revealed the combination of humiliation, power-
lessness, and anger as a separate construct that was distinct from
happiness as well as from shame and fear. Moreover, social
rejection had no influence on shame and fear, which are both
emotions that tend to inhibit action.
Study 2
In Study 2 we used the research paradigm of Study 1 to test our
proposition that vicarious group-based rejection can cause feelings
of humiliation. In addition to a condition in which subjects were
personally rejected, we included a condition in which subjects
observed other ingroup members being rejected by members of a
salient outgroup. Previous research by Gonsalkorale and Williams
[22] has shown that even if people are rejected by members of a
despised outgroup (e.g., the KKK) they show strong rejection
effects. Furthermore, research by Gordijn and colleagues [42244]
suggests that people are likely to respond emotionally to observing
others being victimized when the victims belong to the ingroup,
but not when they belong to the outgroup. Thus, we predicted that
vicarious group-based humiliation is mainly ingroup-based,
meaning that it is more strongly triggered when members of an
outgroup reject members of the ingroup than when they reject
members of an outgroup.
Method
Ethics statement. The study and procedures were approved
by the ethics committee of the Department of Sociology of the
University of Groningen. Whereas Studies 1 and 3 were approved
by the Ethical Committee Psychology (ECP) of the Department of
Psychology of the University of Groningen, Study 2 was
authorized by the Ethical Committee of the Department of
Sociology, because for this study we only recruited undergraduate
sociology students. Written consent was obtained. Prior to the
study, participants were informed orally by the researchers about
the duration and nature of the study. Participants were told that
participation was anonymous and voluntary and that they could
decide to withdraw at any moment or choose to refrain from
answering questions in the survey without consequences of any
type. The same information was also provided on paper on the
introduction page of the questionnaire. All data were anonymized
upon collection by assigning each participant with a unique
identifier, which does not link to the participant’s identity. After
the study, the participants were personally debriefed in writing
(i.e., on the screen) as well as orally by the researchers.
Participants and design. Twenty-nine male and 45 female
undergraduate sociology students from the University of Gronin-
gen participated in the experiment in exchange for 1 study credit
(Mage = 20.09, SD = 1.58). Participants were randomly assigned
to one of only three conditions in the Cyberball paradigm: 1) a
‘‘personal rejection’’ condition, in which the participants were
themselves ostracized by two members of an outgroup; 2) a
‘‘vicarious ingroup rejection’’ condition, in which they observed
one ingroup member being ostracized by two outgroup members,
or 3) a ‘‘vicarious outgroup rejection’’ condition, in which they
observed one outgroup member being ostracized by two members
of yet another outgroup.
Procedure. As in Study 1, participants were seated at a
computer in individual cubicles and the instructions were
presented on the screen. In the personal rejection condition, the
instructions were copied from Study 1. In the two vicarious
rejection conditions, participants were told that it was being
investigated how outsiders perceived social interactions among
groups of people and that they would observe an online ball-
tossing game (Cyberball: [27]) between other participants (who
were actually computer-generated confederates).
The participants then filled in a political preference test, on the
basis of which they were allocated to one of three groups: the
‘‘Leftish’’, ‘‘Rightish’’, or ‘‘Central’’ group. Subsequently, the
participants played in or observed a three-player Cyberball game
in which two perpetrators, who always shared the same political
preference, rejected the third player. The perpetrators’ identities
depended on the participants own identities. For leftish partici-
pants, the perpetrators always represented the rightish group, and
vice versa. For central participants, the perpetrator also repre-
sented the rightish group, because the sample was predominantly
left-oriented (84%). This implies that a) in the personal rejection
condition, both leftish and central participants were rejected by
rightish perpetrators, whereas rightish participants were rejected
by leftish perpetrators; b) in the vicarious ingroup rejection
condition, leftish and central observers witnessed one ingroup
member being rejected by two rightish outgroup members,
Table 1. Rotated structure matrix: Study 1.
Humiliation Shame and Happiness
Fear
Humiliated .791 .230 .318
Degraded .809 .154 .315
Belittled .774 .225 .374
Impotent .795 .297 2.006
Helpless .672 .439 .223
Discouraged .569 .483 .455
Outraged .784 .269 .307
Angry .839 .155 .271
Annoyed .545 .313 .558
Anxious .057 .685 .054
Scared .134 .796 .314
Afraid .234 .748 2.009
Ashamed .433 .778 .042
Feeling shame .318 .764 2.087
Optimistic 2.344 .121 2.602
Happy 2.075 2.039 2.861
Positive 2.402 2.191 2.670
Cheerful 2.251 2.066 2.877
Note. Extraction method: Principal component analysis. Rotation method:
Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0095421.t001
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whereas rightish observers witnessed one ingroup member being
rejected by two central outgroup members; and c) in the vicarious
outgroup rejection condition, leftish and rightish participants
observed two central players reject one rightish or leftish player,
respectively, whereas central players observed two leftish players
reject one rightish player. After the game the same dependent
measures were taken as in Study 1.
Results
Humiliation. We tested our predictions by performing
oneway ANOVAs using the ostracism manipulation (self, ingroup,
or outgroup) as the predictor of feelings of humiliation. As
expected, humiliation was significantly predicted by the ostracism
manipulation, F (2, 71) = 4.62, p,.05, gp
2 = .12. More humiliation
was experienced when participants were ostracized (M = 3.70,
SD = 1.52) or when members of their ingroup were ostracized
(M = 3.26, SD = 1.42), than when members of an outgroup were
ostracized (M = 2.47, SD = 1.28). The difference between personal
rejection and rejection of ingroup members by the outgroup was
not significant, as shown by least significant differences tests
(p = .29). Both of these conditions differed significantly from the
condition in which outgroup members were rejected (p = .004 and
p = .043, respectively). This was in line with the hypotheses on
vicarious group-based humiliation; see Figure 1.
Powerlessness. The ostracism manipulation also had a
significant effect on feelings of powerlessness, F (2, 71) = 5.69,
p,.01, gp
2 = .14, but the personal rejection had a stronger effect
than the vicarious rejection. When the effects of personal rejection
were compared with the effects of rejection of ingroup members by
the outgroup, a least significant differences test showed that
feelings of powerlessness were significantly higher after personal
rejection (M = 4.17, SD = 1.21) than after rejection of ingroup
members (p = .027), or than after rejection of outgroup members
by members of another outgroup (p = .001). We did find that more
powerlessness was experienced when outgroup members rejected
ingroup members (M = 3.32, SD = 1.19), than when they rejected
outgroup members (M = 2.89, SD = 1.40). However, this difference
did not reach significance (p = .22).
Anger. The ostracism manipulation produced a marginally
significant effect on anger, F (2, 71) = 2.74, p,.07, gp
2 = .07. A least
significant differences test showed that anger in response to
personal rejection (M = 4.28, SD = 1.02) was of similar strength to
anger in response to vicarious ingroup rejection (M = 3.56,
SD = 1.44; p = .09), and significantly stronger than in response to
vicarious outgroup rejection (M = 3.32, SD = 1.64; p = .026).
However, no significant differences were found between vicarious
rejection of the ingroup and of the outgroup (p = .54). Therefore,
the hypothesis that vicarious ingroup rejection triggers more anger
than vicarious outgroup rejection is not supported by the data.
Other emotions. With respect to happiness, sham, and fear, no
significant differences were found; all Fs,1.
Factor analysis. As in Study 1, we examined using a factor
analysis whether feelings of humiliation were more closely related
to feelings of anger and powerlessness than to happiness, fear, and
shame. The 18 items were subjected to a principal component
analysis. We performed a Varimax rotation with Kaiser Normal-
ization. The results were relatively similar to those of Study 1. The
factor solution revealed 3 factors with an Eigenvalue . 1. As can
be seen in Table 2, we found the expected humiliation factor with
the humiliation, powerlessness, and anger items (Eigenvalue
= 6.64; explained variance = 37%), although two powerlessness
items (impotent and helpless) also loaded on the ‘fear and shame’
factor that contained the shame and fear items (Eigenvalue = 3.11;
explained variance = 17%). Further, we found a ‘happiness’ factor
that included all positive items (Eigenvalue = 1.72; explained
variance = 10%).
Discussion
The results support the conjecture that humiliation may also be
vicarious and group-based. Participants who had observed
rejection of an ingroup member felt as humiliated as participants
who were personally rejected and significantly more humiliated
than participants who observed the rejection of an outgroup
Table 2. Rotated structure matrix: Study 2.
Humiliation Shame and Happiness
Fear
Humiliated .761 .169 2.010
Degraded .770 .071 .066
Belittled .823 .180 2.041
Impotent .510 .478 .047
Helpless .485 .514 2.093
Discouraged .712 .283 2.142
Outraged .712 .190 .030
Angry .604 .366 2.075
Annoyed .814 .257 2.081
Anxious .252 .724 2.050
Scared .161 .823 .026
Afraid .246 .811 .051
Ashamed .320 .711 .010
Feeling shame .094 .663 .037
Optimistic 2.001 2.083 .868
Happy 2.026 .146 .810
Positive 2.047 2.052 .915
Cheerful 2.051 .029 .893
Note. Extraction method: Principal component analysis. Rotation method:
Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0095421.t002
Figure 1. Dependent measures as a function of rejection of self,
ingroup, or outgroup (Study 2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0095421.g001
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member. This suggests that vicarious humiliation may be confined
to what happens to members of the ingroup.
Findings with respect to powerlessness and anger were more
ambiguous. On the one hand, personal rejection produced more
powerlessness and anger than vicarious rejection of outgroup
members, which is in line with our hypothesized combination of
humiliation, powerlessness, and anger. On the other hand, we
found no support for the hypothesis that vicarious ingroup
rejection triggers more powerlessness and anger than does
vicarious outgroup rejection: participants felt equally powerless
and angry in both conditions. Also, the factor analysis suggests that
at least an element of powerlessness is closely associated with
shame and fear, which suggests an action-inhibiting response.
Together, the findings suggest that indeed both personal and
vicarious forms of rejection are accompanied by humiliation.
However, for effects on powerlessness and anger, the humiliation
was possibly too indirect and the difference between ingroup and
outgroup was possibly too small in Study 2. Therefore, in Study 3,
we made some adaptations to the design.
Study 3
In order to increase the difference between ingroup and
outgroup and the strength of humiliation, in Study 3 we used
ideologically diverse social groups to manipulate an intergroup
context and made humiliation more direct. To prevent emotional
responses from being confounded by the (numerical) minority
status of the victim, in Study 3 we balanced the numbers of
perpetrators and victims. Whereas we relied on the Cyberball
paradigm [27] for the ostracism manipulation in the previous two
studies, in Study 3 we applied a procedure in which participants
were first included and in the next round explicitly rejected, or in
which they watched others being rejected in this way (for similar
procedures, see [47,50251]). Specifically, participants were told
that the perpetrators did not consider them worth interacting with.
We hypothesized that both personal rejection and observed
rejection of ingroup members would trigger higher levels of
humiliation, anger, and powerlessness than observed rejection of
outgroup members or no rejection. Due to the mixed results of
Study 2 and the extended duration of Study 3 (see below),
following our attempts to improve the research design, we decided
to prioritize our aim of testing the combination of vicariously
experienced humiliation, powerlessness, and anger (the focus of
our study) at the expense of a test to disentangle these emotions
from action-inhibiting emotions. Consequently, given time con-
straints and to avoid conducting an unreasonably lengthy
experiment, we dropped the measures for fear and shame. We
included a control condition without rejection in order to see
whether observing an outgroup being rejected by an outgroup
creates effects that are any different from no rejection at all.
Method
Ethics statement. Same as in Study 1.
Participants and design. Sixty-seven male and 30 female
undergraduates of the University of Groningen participated in the
experiment in exchange for 5 euros (Mage = 19.33, SD = 1.25). To
manipulate social rejection, participants were randomly assigned
to one of only three experimental conditions in which they were
told that other participants in the experiment (perpetrators) did not
want to continue playing a game with two other players (victims)
because they perceived these players not worth interacting with: 1)
a ‘‘personal rejection’’ condition; 2) a ‘‘vicarious ingroup
rejection’’ condition; 3) a ‘‘vicarious outgroup rejection’’ condi-
tion. Moreover, a control condition was included in which no
social rejection occurred.
Procedure. Participants were seated at computers in individ-
ual cubicles. All instructions were presented on the screen. The
participants were informed that the researchers were examining
group performance and that they would play or observe an online
ball-game followed by an online quiz with other participants, who
would be logged on at the same time. Based on the results of a
political preference test, participants were then allocated to one of
three groups that represented different political views: the
‘‘Socialist’’ group, the ‘‘Liberal’’ group, or the ‘‘Conservative’’
group. To keep group-affiliation salient, we coupled participants’
initials with the name of their ingroup and addressed them
accordingly throughout the experiment. After being assigned to a
group, participants were informed that four participants would be
randomly selected to play the ball-game and the quiz, and that the
remaining participants would be selected as observers. Subse-
quently, the participants played or observed the ball-game, which
served as a filler task before the manipulation to strengthen
participants’ group identity.
After the ball-game, the ‘players’ were seemingly given the
option of playing the quiz in a homogenous team of players who
shared their political preference, or in a heterogeneous team of
players with different political preferences. Their answers
appeared on the screen, and represented the social rejection
manipulation. In the three rejection conditions, two players who
shared political preferences expressed no interest in teaming up
with players with different political views, whom they perceived as
inferior to themselves. Specifically, one of them claimed that ‘‘I do
not want to be associated with these two {ingroup/outgroup} people. I don’t
understand how people can be so foolish as to adhere to such worthless
ideologies and I would be embarrassed if I had to work together with them. It’s
just best to ignore them’’. In line with this, the other player said: ‘‘I have
no interest in working with the players of the {Ingroup/Outgroup}. These
people have a very narrow minded worldview; you could tell that even from the
ball-game we just played. I do not want to work together with them’’. For
players in the personal rejection condition, this meant that they
were personally rejected. Participants in the two vicarious rejection
conditions witnessed (as observers) the rejection of two members of
either their ingroup or an outgroup by members of a third
outgroup. Participants in the control condition were informed that
the players for the quiz had been randomly selected. The players
in that condition represented two ingroup members and two
outgroup members; no rejection statements were made.
As in Study 2, the identities of the players depended on the
participants’ own identities. For socialist and liberal participants,
the perpetrators always represented the conservative group; for
conservative players, the perpetrators always represented the
socialist group. We decided on this allocation because we assumed
that both liberal and socialist participants would perceive the
conservative group as the most ideologically distant from the
ingroup. We tested this assumption using a pre-measure of
participants’ most and least preferred ideological perspectives. Of
the 38 participants who identified most with the socialist
perspective, 32 disliked the conservative views most. Similarly, of
the 49 participants who identified most with the liberal viewpoint,
35 ticked the conservative view as their least favorite political
perspective. This allocation rule implies that a) in the personal
rejection condition both socialist and liberal participants were
rejected by conservative perpetrators, whereas conservative
participants were rejected by socialist participants; b) in the
vicarious ingroup rejection condition, socialist and liberal partic-
ipants witnessed two ingroup members being rejected by two
conservative outgroup members, whereas conservative observers
Vicarious Group-Based Rejection
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witnessed the rejection of ingroup members by socialist outgroup
members; c) in the vicarious outgroup condition, socialist and
liberal participants observed two conservative players reject two
liberal and socialist players, respectively, whereas conservative
players observed two socialist players reject two liberal players.
After this, we measured feelings of humiliation, powerlessness,
anger, and happiness as in the first two studies.
Results
Humiliation. We tested our predictions by performing
oneway ANOVAs with the social rejection manipulation as the
predictor of feelings of humiliation. As expected, humiliation was
significantly predicted by the rejection manipulation, F (3,
93) = 11.91, p,.01, gp
2 = .28. Participants experienced more
humiliation when they were personally rejected (M = 3.48,
SD = 1.69) or when members of their ingroup were rejected
(M = 3.63, SD = 1.30), than when members of an outgroup were
rejected (M = 2.28, SD = 1.21), or when no rejection occurred
(M = 1.70, SD = .98). Least significant differences tests showed that
the personal rejection and ingroup rejection conditions did not
differ from each other (p = .70), whereas they both differed from
the outgroup rejection condition (both ps ,.01), and the control
condition (both ps,.01).The outgroup rejection condition and the
control condition did not differ significantly (p = .14); see Figure 2.
Powerlessness. Supporting our hypothesis, the rejection
manipulation also had a significant effect on feelings of power-
lessness, F (3, 93) = 5.58, p,.01, gp
2 = .15. Participants felt more
powerless when they were rejected (M = 3.31, SD = 1.49), or when
members of their ingroup were rejected (M = 3.29, SD = 0.99),
than when members of an outgroup were rejected (M = 2.46,
SD = 1.34), or when no rejection occurred (M = 2.10, SD = 1.16).
Least significant differences tests showed that the personal
rejection and ingroup rejection conditions did not differ from
each other (p = .97), whereas they both differed from the outgroup
rejection condition (both ps,.05), and the control condition (both
ps,.01). The outgroup rejection condition and the control
condition did not differ significantly (p = .33).
Anger. Also as expected, the rejection manipulation signifi-
cantly predicted feelings of anger, F (3, 93) = 18.71, p,.01,
gp
2 = .38. Participants felt angrier when they were rejected
(M = 4.40, SD = 1.46), or when members of their ingroup were
rejected (M = 4.25, SD = 1.17), than when members of an out-
group were rejected (M = 3.21, SD = 1.68), or when no rejection
occurred (M = 1.78, SD = 1.03). Least significant differences tests
showed that the personal rejection and ingroup rejection
conditions did not differ from each other (p = .70), whereas they
both differed from the outgroup rejection condition (both ps,.01)
and the control condition (both ps,.01). The outgroup rejection
condition and the control condition also differed significantly
(p,.01), suggesting that observing outgroup members being
unfairly rejected does make people somewhat angry (but less so
than when the self or ingroup members are rejected).
Happiness. No significant differences were found with
respect to happiness, F,1, p = .48. See Figure 2 for all means.
Discussion
In line with our hypotheses, these results indicate that being
rejected by members of an outgroup triggers a combination of
humiliation, powerlessness, and anger. In this study we used a
stronger (more direct) rejection manipulation and more pro-
nounced ingroup/outgroup differences. Rather than being subtly
ostracized in a Cyberball game (as in Studies 1 and 2), participants
learned in this study that members of other groups did not want to
team up with the players from their group (explicit rejection).
Whereas Study 2 produced ambiguous results pertaining to
vicarious group-based powerlessness and anger, the findings in
Study 3 (using a stronger rejection manipulation) were unambig-
uously in line with the hypothesis that people can experience
humiliation vicariously after observing ingroup members (but not
outgroup members) being rejected, and that humiliation is
accompanied by powerlessness and anger. In fact, the results
suggest that the intensity of emotional responses to the rejection of
ingroup members can be equal to that of emotional responses to
being personally rejected. In sharp contrast, observing the
rejection of outgroup members did not evoke much stronger
emotional responses than observing no rejection at all.
General Discussion
Although humiliation is often mentioned as a source of violent
conflict, including genocide [7] and terrorism [52], the experience
of humiliation is still poorly understood [16]. Of particular
importance for the social relevance of humiliation is the possibility
that it can be experienced vicariously, after observing ingroup
members being rejected, even when one is not personally involved
in the event. We argued and found that being rejected or seeing
ingroup members being rejected as inferior and/or not worth
bothering with, triggers the experience of being humiliated. We
also argued and found that (vicarious) experiences of humiliation
are accompanied by feelings of powerlessness and anger, which fits
with previous findings and ideas by scholars in the field of
humiliation [527,15216,18].
As far as we know, the consequences of vicarious group-based
rejection had not been investigated previously (see also [25]). Some
research emerged recently on vicarious ostracism [31232]. For
instance, Wesselman, Bagg, and Williams [33] found that simply
observing ostracism causes negative affect and threats to funda-
mental needs. However, the authors did not examine the role of
group membership. We predicted that only the rejection of ingroup
members would trigger the combination of humiliation, power-
lessness, and anger. This combination of humiliation, powerless-
ness and anger found support in our studies, which links
humiliation to action oriented emotions. Moreover, although the
findings of Study 2 were ambiguous regarding the ingroup-based
effect for powerlessness and anger (but not humiliation), the
Figure 2. Dependent measures as a function of rejection of self,
ingroup, or outgroup, or no rejection (Study 3).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0095421.g002
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findings of Study 3 were unambiguously in line with the hypothesis
that vicariously experienced humiliation is confined to ingroup
members only.
Remarkably, the findings of Study 3 suggest that people can
experience vicarious group-based humiliation as intensely as
personal humiliation. Moreover, the findings of Studies 1 and 2
offer preliminary indications that humiliation may be more likely
to be associated with action-oriented emotions such as anger than
with action-inhibiting emotions such as fear and shame. Although
further data are required to corroborate these findings, such effects
do point at the potential importance of vicarious group-based
humiliation. Without being targeted personally, people can
experience negative rejection effects (e.g., needs deficits, patho-
logical consequences [27]) just by observing their ingroup being
rejected. And due to the links between humiliation and anger and,
in turn, between anger and aggressive action tendencies [14], the
rejection of only a few group members may suffice to trigger anger
and aggressive responses from entire groups who respond
emotionally to the plight suffered by those with whom they
identify. In other words, due to vicarious humiliation effects,
aggressive reactions might spread quite easily.
Smith’s model of social emotions [36] adds theoretical credence
to such potential implications. Smith argues that when group
membership is salient, the ingroup becomes part of the psycho-
logical self, resulting in the experience of emotions in response to
events affecting (members of) the ingroup. Previous research
supporting that model has revealed that people can experience
group-based anger [44], group-based guilt [39], and group-based
fear [53]. In line with those findings, in the present research,
especially in Study 3, we found preliminary support for not only
group-based anger but also group-based feelings of humiliation
and powerlessness. Together, these findings add to the literature
on both group-based emotions and social rejection and create a
launch pad for further investigations of the possibility of vicarious
group-based humiliation.
Future research
Although humiliation is receiving increasing empirical attention
(e.g., [23]), little is known about the causes and exact dimensions of
the experience. We focused on the role of social rejection, but
further research is needed to narrow down the exact conditions
under which people feel humiliated. For example, we propose that
social rejection in the sense of being made to feel worthless can
cause humiliation. It would be interesting to compare this rejection
effect with lowering people’s power or taking away their
experience of control. Would they show emotional responses that
are similar to those in response to being rejected? Further, the
scholarly debate on humiliation would benefit from an analysis of
the relation between humiliation and related emotions such as fear
and, in particular, shame. The literature is inconclusive as to
whether and how humiliation and shame are connected, although
the general consensus appears to be that although similar in some
respects, they have distinct features and produce different
behavioral responses (e.g., [16]). In our study, humiliation was
not closely related to shame, although some elements of
powerlessness, which we believed to be part of the humiliating
experience, appeared to be connected with shame and fear.
Moreover, Leidner et al. [23] found some overlap between
humiliation, anger, and shame, which led them to conclude that
‘‘the emotional experience of ‘‘humiliation’’ is like that of ‘‘anger’’
in some respects, and like ‘‘shame’’ in others, but it is not the same
as either one’’ (p4).
Future research may also examine specific behavioral responses
related to the combination of humiliation, powerlessness, and
anger. This is potentially a dangerous mix. For example, research
by Kamans, Otten, and Gordijn [17] revealed that group
members who feel powerless and angry are more likely to confront
an outgroup in reaction to a threat, especially if they strongly
identify with their ingroup. Further, research by Kamans, Otten,
Gordijn, and Spears [54] has shown that people who perceive
their ingroup as powerless are more likely to show unconstructive
behavior (e.g., use of threat or demands, negative tone and/or
abusive language) in intergroup conflict when their position seems
to be hopeless. Combined with humiliation, such offensive
reactions might be even stronger.
Studies 1 and 2 were conducted among minimal groups. In
Study 3, we used existing political differences to define groups. We
saw that the results were more pronounced when we used real-life
differences between the groups. Still, even though we observed the
predicted differences between conditions, in absolute terms,
humiliation experienced by the subjects was not strong. It stands
to reason that experiences of vicarious group-based humiliation
are intensified when group membership is real or permanent
rather than temporary. For example, Wirth and Williams [21]
found that participants with temporary, permanent, or no group
membership initially felt equally distressed after being ostracized,
but that permanent group membership caused slower recovery
than temporary group membership. A step further in this direction
would be to investigate (vicarious) humiliation in real-life
intergroup contexts, such as the Palestinian/Israeli conflict.
Compared with research conducted in the laboratory, studies of
real-life experiences of humiliation might also find a more
pronounced negative effect on feelings of happiness and joy, as
was found by Ginges and Atran among Palestinians [12].
It would also be relevant to examine whether emotional
responses of humiliation, powerlessness, and anger to vicarious
rejection of ingroup members are limited to situations in which
members of the ingroup are rejected by outgroup members (the
focus of the present study), or can also be experienced when
ingroup victims are rejected by ingroup perpetrators. On the one
hand, research findings (e.g., [55]) suggest that people may be
more sensitive to rebuffs from outgroup members than from
ingroup members, such that rejection of ingroup members by
other ingroup members might be tolerated relatively well. On the
other hand, the black sheep effect [56] suggests that threatening
ingroup members may be judged negatively, which would lead to
the derogation and rejection of ingroup members who humiliate
other ingroup members. Future research may investigate the role
of factors such as identification with the group and the conditions
under which the humiliation takes place to further examine the
dimensions of vicarious group-based humiliation.
Limitations of the present study
Although the present study has yielded some interesting
findings, its design is not without flaws. Several caveats deserve
mentioning. A major limitation of the present research is that
several confounding factors exist, which were not measured in this
study but which may influence the observed outcomes. For
example, given that the experience of humiliation is likely to
encompass a sense of being lowered and being made to feel
inferior, it would have been relevant to explicitly measure the
extent to which participants actually experienced this lowering of
status and whether they perceive the perpetrators as superior to
themselves. Control and the intensity of powerlessness may also
have played a role. Participants in the present study lacked
opportunities to respond to the rejection (e.g., by reacting to the
rejection or directly addressing the perpetrators); this lack of
control may have intensified emotional responses of powerlessness.
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Also, in Study 3, a rejection manipulation was used in which
participants were explicitly rejected on the basis of their group
membership, which was in turn based on political preferences. It is
not known to what degree rejection on the grounds of political
preferences is experienced as both personal and group-based
rejection. This too would be worth-while investigating in future
research.
In sum, although we believe that our findings provide an
encouraging starting point for further research on vicarious
humiliation, more research, also outside the laboratory, is needed
to clearly delineate the conditions for vicarious humiliation, to
disentangle the concept of humiliation from other emotions, and
to examine the potential behavioral outcomes of (vicarious)
humiliation. What we did show is that vicarious group-based
humiliation can be substantial. It therefore is worth receiving
much more attention than it has had so far.
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